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Effectiveness of Advanced and Authenticated Packet Marking 
         Scheme for Trace back of Denial of Service Attacks 
 
 
                                               Abstract 
 
Advanced and Authenticated Packet Marking (AAPM) scheme is one of the proposed 
packet marking schemes for the traceback of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. AAPM uses 
hash functions to reduce the storage space requirement for encoding of router 
information in the IP header. In this paper we take the perspective of the attacker and 
analyze the effects of inserting fake edges against AAPM. Since the AAPM scheme is 
subject to spoofing of the marking field, by inserting fake edges (corrupting the marking 
field) in the packets the attacker can impede traceback. In this paper, we show that the 
attacker can increase this distance by inserting fake edges in packets. Therefore, the 
attacker can make it appear to the victim that the attack was launched from a node farther 
away than it actually was, thus maintaining his own anonymity. 
    
 
1. Introduction. 
 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks has been a major threat to the Internet for a long time now.  
racing the source of an attack has been seen as one of the solutions to DoS attacks. Techniques 
have been proposed to determine the source of a large DoS attack, Probabilistic Packet Marking 
(PPM) [4], Adjusted Probabilistic Packet Marking scheme (APPM) [6], and AAPM. However, the 
inherent ability of attackers to spoof the attack packets makes traceback by Packet-Marking-base 
techniques a major challenge. This is the reason why the Internet community is reluctant to 
implement these proposed schemes in practice. In this paper we analyze the effectiveness of a 
packet marking scheme. A critical analysis of this nature is very important to define the 
practicality of these schemes. Although, these schemes are innovative for traceback, the 
imperfect nature of the IP protocol prevents these schemes to provide a complete solution to the 
problem of DoS attacks. In PPM, APPM and AAPM, the attack packets are marked with router 
information, which when received at the victim’s end, is used to reconstruct the attack path. 
however, along with spoofing the source address in the attack packets, the attacker can also poof 
the marking field in the packets. In PPM, a large fraction of the attack packets reach the  victim 
unmarked. Using these unmarked packets then attacker can hide his identity by inserting fake 
edges in the attack packets [5]. In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of AAPM based on a 
fixed marking probability (PPM) and on a variable marking probability (APPM). The basic 
assumption of AAPM is that the victim has a map of upstream routers using which the source of 
the DoS attack can be traced, hop by hop starting at the router closet to it. However, assuming 
the attacker has a map of all its upstream routers from the attacking host, the attacker can find 
routers not present in the actual attack path to the victim. Using this information, the attacker can 
insert fake edges in the attack traffic. When the traceback of the DoS attack is conducted, the 
victim would be deceived into tracing the attack to a much greater path length. Using the 
simulation software tool, Arena 5.0 [9], it will be shown that the number of fake edges reaching 
the victim is sufficient to make it appear to the victim, that the DoS attack was launched from a 
node farther away than the actual path length. The paper is organized as follows. We present a 
background to the problem of traceback by PPM, APPM and AAPM in section 2. In section 3, we 
present the analysis of the effectiveness of AAPM. In section 4; we use Arena 5.0 to simulate 
networks of different path length to support our theoretical analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Related Work. 
2.1.Probabilistic Packet Marking. 
 
In PPM [4], the router chooses to encode fragments of its IP address in the 16 bit IP identification 
field of the packet’s header with some fixed probability. The Identification field is divided into a 
start, end and distance field. When a router decides to mark a packet it encodes its own address 
in the start field and a zero in the distance field. Otherwise, if the distance field is already zero, it 
indicates that the packet was marked by the previous router. In this case the router writes its own 
address into the end field. Finally if the router does not mark the packet  it always increments the 
distance field in the packets. The victim uses the edges in the packets to traceback the attack 
path. 
 
 2.2. Adjusted PPM. 
The main idea of APPM [6] is to reduce the computational time for reconstructing the attack path 
by using a higher marking probability for routers farther away from the victim. The time for the 
algorithm to converge mainly depends on receiving samples from the furthest router, which in turn 
depends on the marking probability. In APPM, the routers mark packets with decreasing 
probability as the packets traverse towards the destination. Ideally, one would like to receive 
equal number of marked packets from all routers. To avoid the attacker affecting the marking 
probabilities of the routers, [6] proposes to mark packets with respect to the distance of the router 
from the destination. Since the marking probability depends on the distance of the router from the 
victim, this scheme is not subject to spoofing of the marking field. The routers mark the packets 
with probability p=1/(c+1-dv) Here v d is the distance of the router to the victim and c is a 
constant. To make (c+1-dv)>1 the authors of [6] take c =30, since most path lengths are bounded 
by 30. The probability of receiving packets from a router at a distance dv from the victim is 1/c. 
The effectiveness of APPM has been discussed in [10]. 
2.3. Overview of AAPM. 
AAPM [1] was proposed with the aim of reducing the computational overhead of traceback. The  
basic assumption in AAPM is that the victim has a map of upstream [2] routers using which, the 
victim using the markings in the attack packets, can trace the source of the attack hop by hop, 
starting at the router closet to it. In AAPM, two independent hash functions h and h’ are used 
to encode routers’ IP addresses into the marking field of the IP header. Both h and h’ have 11 bit 
outputs. Every router marks the packet with a fixed probability p when forwarding the packet. If a 
router Ri decides to mark a packet, it writes h(Ri) into the edge field and 0 into the distance field. 
Otherwise, if the distance is 0 which implies that a previous router has marked the packet, it 
XORs h’(Ri)  with the edge field value and overwrites the edge field with the result of the XOR. 
The router always increments the distance field if it decides not to mark the packet. The XOR of 
two neighboring routers encode the edge between two routers of the upstream router map. All 
marked packets will contain XOR result of two neighboring routers except for packets marked one 
hop away from the victim. Since  a xor b xor a=b , starting from markings from routers one hop 
away from the victim, the victim decodes the previous edge. Using independent hash functions it 
is possible to know the order of the two routers in the XOR result. The victim repeats 
the steps until it reaches the maximal distance marked in the packets. Thus the victim econstructs 
the attack path. 
3. Effectiveness of AAPM. 
It is know that the attacker cannot fake edges between itself and the victim since routers  
increment the distance field of packets passing through them. However, the attacker can insert 
fake edges to make packets appear to have arrived from a distance greater than the actual path 
length. We assume that the attacker spoofs the marking filed of packets sent in the attack, with 
router addresses not present in the actual attack path. To illustrate our assumption we consider 
the network as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig1: Network with routers not in attack path  
 
The network consists of an attacker and a victim as shown in the figure. The network also 
consists of d routers  V1,……,Vd-1,Vd  between the attacker and the victim and m routers 
Vd+1,Vd+2,…..,Vd+m at path  lengths d+1,d+2,…..,d+m respectively from the victim. The 
attacker needs to send packets with distance field 0 and an edge value containing the hash of 
the IP address of the router ( Vd+1 ) thus creating a fake edge. If these packets enter the 
network and arrive at the first router in the attack path ( Vd ), according to the marking scheme of 
AAPM, since the distance field is zero, the router will insert the XOR value of the hash of its IP 
address ( Vd ) and the hash of the existing value in the edge field of the packet, thus creating an 
edge between attacker Victim itself (  Vd ) and spoofed edge value Vd+1 . See Fig 1. Once this 
edge is created, the attacker needs to create edges between Vd+1 and a router Vd+2  at a 
distance (d+2) from the victim. The attacker inserts fake edges between Vd+1 and Vd+2 and 
inserts 1 in the distance field. the 1 in the distance field indicates that an edge was created 
between the two previous routers. If this packet is marked, the previous markings will be 
overwritten. If this packet is unmarked, the routers in the network will at least increment the 
distance field. With a certain probability these packets will reach the victim unmarked and with a 
distance field of (  d+1 ) and an edge value (  Vd+1 , Vd+2 ). The aim of this paper is to show 
using simulations that the path length can appear to be greater than it actually is using fake 
edges as explained above. It is shown that the tools for mapping upstream routers can be used 
against the trace back scheme. Both the fixed probability marking scheme and the variable 
probability marking scheme are considered in the simulations. The analysis similar to [5] is used 
for the above network. Let m be the fake path length created by the attacker using spoofing. The 
value of m is a function of the fake edges 0 x in the attack packets. We want to maximize m 
subject to the constraint that we get packets from the weakest link with edges values (Vd Vd- ) 
and also the number of each fake edge created is greater than or equal to the number of packets 
from the weakest link. We assume that all the packets are marked with the spoofing value  
(Vi, Vi-1),I=d+1,d+2,….d+m . Also, if n0(p)=N&o=N(1-p)powd is the number of unmarked 
packets, then  
 
no(p)=sigma(i=d to d+m)) nipows(p)                      (3.1) 
where nipows(p) is the number of packets of each fake edge 
reaching the victim unmarked. &I(p)=p(1-p)powd-i is the probability of receiving a packet from the 
ith router in the attack path. If it holds that, the  number of packets of each spoofed edge equals 
the number of marked packets from the first router in the attack path, 
n1(p)=n1pows(p)=n2(p)=………..=nmpows(p)              (3.2)          
Then, the attack would appear to have been launched from a distance of (d+m) . Equating 
marginal probabilities 
 &1(p)=&1pows(p)=&2pows(p)=………….=&powm(p)                                     (3.3) 
For the equation 3.4 to hold, it is necessary that the attacker inserts spoofed or fakes edges with 
a uniform probability. 
Pr{xo=Vi,Vi-1}=1/m,I=d+1,……d+m 
Here, if &0 is the probability of a packet reaching the victim unmarked and &1 is the probability of 
a packet reaching the victim marked by the first router and nowhere after the first router, the 
following the following two cases can be considered  
Case I: Fixed Marking Probability: The necessary and sufficient condition for the equation 3.3 to          
hold is 
 M&1=&0=>m=(1-p)/p                                                            (3.4) 
Using the optimal value of p=0.04, we have  m=24 . From equation 3.4, one would assume that 
the value of m does not in fact depend on distance d . This implies that, no matter what distance 
the attacks are carried out from, the attacker will always have the option of including 24 fake 
edges in the packets. 
Case II: Decreasing Marking Probability: The necessary condition for equation 3.4 to hold is 
M&1=&0=>m=(1-pd)pd                                                                                              (3.5) 
Here  pd is the probability of the first router in the attack path, d hops away from the victim to 
mark the packets. We know that pd=1/c+1-d .Substituting in the above equation, we have 
M=c-d                                                            (3.6) 
The above result implies that, the number of fake edges reaching the victim depends on the 
number of routers present on the attack path. 
 
4. Simulations Using Arena 5.0. 
 
The simulations are carried out using the simulation software tool, Arena 5.0. Simulations are a 
very important part of this paper. Using Arena, we could model networks and support the analysis 
of AAPM in a very easy and effective way. The reason Arena 5.0 was used was because it has a 
very good Graphical User Interface and complex networks can be easily modeled to illustrate the 
Effectiveness of packet marking schemes. We have simulated networks basically consisting of a 
Victim and an Attacker and different number of routers in between them. For the case of fixed 
marking probability, two cases have been considered of different path lengths. The first 
network is a 5 hop network and the second is a 15 hop network. In both the networks, the packets 
sent into the network are assigned or inscribed with 24 spoofed edges each of which representing 
an edge not actually present in the attack path. For the case of variable marking probability, the 
marking probability is calculated using the algorithm in section 2.2. We consider a 5 hop network 
for this case. The count of the fake edges at the victim’s end is a measure of the effectiveness of 
AAPM. Case 1: 5 Router Network. The first network consists of 5routers between the attacker 
and the victim. The attackers ends all the packets spoofed with 24 different edges. The marking 
probabilities of all the routers are 4% Total Number of Packets Sent: 120,000; Number of 
Individual spoofed edges: 120,000 / 24 = 5000; Total Number of Unmarked Packets = 97844; 
Number of Packets marked by the furthest router from the victim in the attack path = 4076.8; 
Number of each spoofed edge reaching the victim = 97844/24 = 4076.8; Simulation Results: Let 
he 5 Routers in the attack path be  named R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5. Let the attacker send 24 fake 
edges called A, B,…….., X. Table 1 shows the count of unmarked edges and marked packets 
from  the 5 routers. The unmarked packets, consists of different 24 edges and all average around 
4070 n number. It is observed that the number of marked packets from R1 which is furthest away 
from he victim is approximately equal to the number of each unmarked edge. Therefore the 
simulation results were in agreement with the theoretical results.  
Average over 10 Replications 
 Type of Edge                                        Average  
 
Count A Unmarked                         4073.10  
Count B Unmarked                  4067.40  
Count C Unmarked                 4073.10  
Count D Unmarked                 4081.10 
Count E Unmarked                  4069.00 
Count F Unmarked                  4072.30 
Count G Unmarked   4085.30 
Count H Unmarked   4062.70 
Count I Unmarked   4076.70 
Count J Unmarked   4080.30 
Count K Unmarked   4071.70 
Count L Unmarked   4074.70 
Count M Unmarked  4079.20 
Count N Unmarked   4067.60 
Count O Unmarked   4069.90 
Count P Unmarked   4076.00 
Count Q Unmarked                 4071.20 
Count R Unmarked   4070.60 
Count S Unmarked   4074.80 
Count T Unmarked   4083.00 
Count U Unmarked   4085.90 
Count V Unmarked   4064.40 
Count W Unmarked  4064.30 
Count X Unmarked   4082.00 
Record R1 Packets   4072.70 
Record R2 Packets   4242.20 
Record R3 Packets   4421.50 
Record R4 Packets   4659.80 
Record R5 Packets   4827.50 
Table 1: Count of Marked and Unmarked Packets 
for Network with 5 routers 
Case 2: 15 Router Network: The second network consists of 15 routers between the attacker and  
he victim. The attacker sends all the packets spoofed with 24 different edges. Total Number of 
packets: 120,000; Number of spoofed edges = 24; Number of individual spoofed edges = 120,000    
4 = 5000; Total Number of Unmarked Packets:= 65050.36; Number of Packets marked by the  
furthest router from the victim in the attack path = 2710.43;  Number of each spoofed edge  
reaching the victim= 65050.36/24 = 2710.43 Simulation Results: Let the 15 Routers in the attack  
path  be named R1 to R15. Table 2 shows the simulation results that give the individual count of 
packets from the 15 routers and the 24 fake edges named A, B,…, X. It is observed from the 
table hat the count of unmarked edges is individually equal to the number of packets from R1. 
Therefore the simulation results were in agreement with the theoretical results  
Average over 10  applications 
 
Type of Edge                  Average Count 
 
Count Packets   R1 2718.70 
Count Packets   R2 2802.70 
Count Packets   R3 2930.00 
Count Packets   R4 3095.40 
Count Packets   R5 3178.60 
Count Packets   R6 3343.90 
Count Packets   R7 3447.20 
Count Packets   R8 3607.80 
Count Packets   R9 3767.50 
Count Packets   RT10 3943.10 
Count Packets   RT11 4105.70 
Count Packets   RT12 4272.90 
Count Packets   RT13 4432.10 
Count Packets   RT14 4576.60 
Count Packets   RT15 4747.90 
Record A Unmarked  2718.80 
Record B Unmarked  2702.20 
Record C Unmarked  2707.80 
Record D Unmarked  2720.20 
Record E Unmarked  2710.70 
Record F Unmarked  2715.40 
Record G Unmarked  2686.80 
Record H Unmarked  2719.30 
Record I Unmarked   2717.10 
Record J Unmarked  2708.10 
Record K Unmarked  2716.30 
Record L Unmarked  2719.80 
Record M Unmarked  2720.90 
Record N Unmarked  2694.20 
Record O Unmarked  2719.00 
Record P Unmarked  2710.70 
Record Q Unmarked  2724.20 
Record R Unmarked  2702.50 
Record S Unmarked  2698.40 
Record T Unmarked  2715.30 
Record U Unmarked  2695.70 
Record V Unmarked  2709.10 
Record W Unmarked  2720.80 
Record X Unmarked  2676.60 
Table 2: Count of Marked and Unmarked Packets for a Network with 15 routers 
 
 
Case 3: 5 Router Network with Decreasing Probabilities: In this case, the routers mark the 
packets  with decreasing probabilities as the packets traverse towards the victim. A network with 
5 routers is  considered. Therefore, according to the marking scheme in section 2.2, the marking     
probabilities for the 5 routers are as follows, R1 = 0.0384, R2 = 0.037, R3 = 0.0357, R4 = 0.0344, 
5 = 0.0333. Since, m=1-pd/pd=25, the attacker spoofs all the packets with 25 spoofed edges A, 
B,……… X, Y. Total Number of Packets = 125,000; Number of spoofed edges m = 5; Number of 
individual spoofed edges sent = N/m = 5000; Total Number of Unmarked Packets = 104166.6; 
Number of Packets marked by each of the  routers in the attack path = N/c = 4166.6;  number of 
each spoofed edges reaching the victim =104166.6 / 25 = 4166.6 Simulation Result:  able 4 
shows the simulation results that give the individual count of packets from the 15  routers  and the 
25 fake edges named A, B,…, Y. It can be observed from the table that the count of unmarked 
edges is individually equal to the number of packets from any of the routers. When the victim 
reconstructs the DoS attack, the 25 fake edges will prevent the victim to identify the exact node 
from which the attack first entered the network. Therefore the simulation results were in 
agreement with the theoretical results 
 
 Average over 10 Replications  
 
Type of Packet                Average Count  
 
Count Packets from R1  4143.30 
Count Packets from R2  4161.30 
Count Packets from R3  4171.90 
Count Packets from R4  4193.20 
Count Packets from R5  4175.00 
Record A Unmarked  4155.70 
Record B Unmarked  4177.10 
Record C Unmarked  4163.90 
Record D Unmarked  4162.10 
Record E Unmarked  4174.80 
Record F Unmarked  4163.00 
Record G Unmarked  4156.20 
Record H Unmarked  4162.40 
Record I Unmarked  4163.10 
Record J Unmarked   4180.70 
Record K Unmarked  4177.60 
Record L Unmarked                  4176.70 
Record M Unmarked  4158.00 
Record N Unmarked  4153.10 
Record O Unmarked  4167.80 
Record P Unmarked  4165.10 
Record Q Unmarked  4174.40 
Record R Unmarked  4171.10 
Record S Unmarked  4160.60 
Record T Unmarked  4169.90 
Record U Unmarked  4159.80 
Record V Unmarked  4164.00 
Record W Unmarked  4152.90 
Record X Unmarked  4175.50 
Record Y Unmarked  4169.80 
Table 4: Count of Marked and Unmarked Packets 
for a Network with 5 routers 
 
 
                                                 Conclusion. 
 
 
Trace back using AAPM Schemes is a very useful method. It considerably reduces the   
computational overhead at the victims end by using hash functions for encoding router 
information n the packets. However, the unmarked packets would make it appear to the victim 
that the attack was launched from a node farther away from the actual attacking node. Although 
AAPM reduces computational overhead by a considerable factor and can also handle Distributed 
DoS [5] attacks, t still suffers from uncertainty in the authenticity of the trace back. The 
simulations included in this aper clearly illustrate the amount of uncertainty that can be inserted 
by the attacker. In the case of mixed marking scheme, no matter from what distance the attack is 
launched from, there will always e enough unmarked packets to insert an uncertainty factor m=24 
Similarly, in the case of increasing probability, the number of fake edges reaching the victim 
depends on the number of  outers in the attack path. Therefore, when the victim receives these 
packets and reconstructs the attack path, the fake edges will deceive the victim into  
reconstructing the path to a greater length  than it actually is. 
